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HUMANISTS
and Rationalists
Phil Cleary's win in Wills was trumpeted as the death of 
'economic rationalism'. But just what is (or was) it? 
Denise Meredyth argues that the liberal academy's 
picture of the 'rationalist' bureaucracy is a mite simplistic.
conomic Rationalism in Canberra, 
Michael Pusey's colourful account of 
the 'locust plague' of 'economic 
rationalism' in the Australian public 
service, has been one of the most popular 
academic contributions to public debate for 
some time. As a polemic, the book deserves its 
success. It is lively and emphatic in style, 
equivalent in appeal to the histories of Manning 
Clarke and Ross Fitzgerald, those favourites of 
The Bulletin. Unlike much academic debate, it is 
also accessible to a wide audience, partly because 
it evokes the economic winds whistling through 
the empty city centre of Canberra, but also be­
cause it calls upon a number of strong ideal 
figures, including that of the principled social
reformer, the callous yuppie public servant and 
the econocrat—not to mention the fearless social 
critic and universal intellectual.
The book piled high in bookshops over Christmas, and 
Pusey's appearance in the press provided a starting point 
for many dinner parties and academic papers. Although 
many of the academic arguments had been in circulation 
for some time before the appearance of the book, its release 
has meant that the terms of its discussion have bene widely 
adopted. And in the process, the term 'economic 
rationalism' has become a shorthand for some very sweep­
ing dism issals of various Labor policies and of 
bureaucracy in general.
Used precisely, the term 'economic rationalism' can be 
useful in identifying a particular form of governmental 
rationality and political vocabulary. In some usages, it 
refers to a specific kind of economic and political
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rationality, involving limitations to the activity of the state 
and support for the unfettered freedom of the market. But 
in the present debate it is the focus of some confusion, being 
used to refer to seemingly random combinations of the 
'rational' and the 'economic', including various account­
ability measures, almost any cutback in governmental ex­
penditure, and most forms of bureaucratic procedure 
Which do not correspond to global goals, claims and criti­
ques.
Pusey's key argument—for those who weren't given the 
book for Christmas—is that there has been a fundamental 
change in Australian public administration. The public 
service, once the home of social democratic reform, has
been overtaken by 'economic rationalism and corporate 
managerialism. Since more and more economics graduates 
have been recruited into the most powerful sections of 
public administration, the public service has been 
colonised by a particularly repellent spedes, that of the 
ambitious young 'econocrat'.
Thee 'econocrat', we are told, is a conservative yuppie, 
usually male, from a private school and trained in 
economics or management. These comparatively young 
economics graduates now fill the senior ranks of the central 
agency departments of Treasury, Finance and Prime Mini­
ster and Cabinet, forming a powerful cadre force within 
government. Ambitious, hardworking and clever they
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may be, but this spedes of econocrats lacks the ethics and 
social insight possessed by the earlier generation of 'social 
democratic intellectuals' who once staffed the public ser­
vice.
The conservatism of today's Senior Executive Service of­
ficers is specified by means of questionnaires and inter­
views on such questions as the deregulation of the 
Australian dollar and of the Australian capital and finan­
cial markets, their judgments about the distribution of 
GDP, their attitude to unions and their position on the 
deregulation of the labour market. The respondents, it 
appears, have little or no commitment to central govern­
ment and state intervention, oppose unionism and support 
free market economics. They are preoccupied with 
economic, utilitarian and technical concerns, at the ex­
pense of broader social principles. Furthermore, they deny 
that their professional work is shaped by personal values 
or principles, insisting instead that the protocols of their 
professional lives are politically neutral. These responses 
are taken as symptoms of a more fundamental problem: a 
rejection of the key values of the social democratic 'people- 
serving' state.
There are two kinds of reason given for this change in 
values. One is a shift in the educational background of 
graduate recruits to the public service, resulting in much 
smaller numbers of senior officers with a liberal humanist 
educational background and many more with training in 
economics, law and management. The other strand of 
argument concerns itself with general flaws in the national 
conscience and character; describing how anti-intellec- 
tualism, cynicism and lack of vision have allowed 
'economic rationalism' to become acceptable to the 
Australian public
The contrast is most strongly marked by comparison with 
the sodal reforms of 20 years ago under Whitlam. In the 
70s, so the story goes, there was a strong public sector 
commitment to liberal sodal democraticgoals and support 
for radical governmental intervention in education, health 
and community development. State policy and action were 
determined by a partnership between bureaucracy and 
'the community', and bureaucratic language and 
rationality was organic with the 'lived culture' of the com­
munity.
With high numbers of humanities graduates recruited into 
the public service, senior public servants were filled with 
the values provided by a broad liberal education. 
Equipped with the sodal insight provided by humanist 
sociology, psychology and human relations theory, 
bureaucrats were able to be in touch with sodal situations 
in the real world beyond Canberra. There was no split 
between the bureaucratic and the social, the human and 
the technical, the prindpled and utility, the sodal and the 
economic.
But since this time, Pusey argues, universalistic prindples 
and the promise of culture have been forsaken for 'modem 
utilitarianism', a tougher and colder reliance on the judi- 
dal and administrative arms of the state. The nation's faith
is now placed not in general social prindples, but in "the 
more modem universalism of judicial and administrative 
deliberation, dedsion, and above all, 'fair' allocation". The 
poor substitute for the greater ends of culture and equality 
is the limited administrative goal of formal democracy, 
dtizenship, equity and accountability.
What we have, then, is something like a family saga of the 
Australian state, marking the decline from ethical vigour 
to degeneracy. The pioneering postwar generation of 
Keynesian reconstructionists are the heroes here. They 
held staunchly to a program of sodal reconstruction stem­
ming from their "own distinctively Australian vision of a 
nation-building state". But the present generation of senior 
public servants is preoccupied only with mean goals. As it 
turns out, these unworthy goals indude "fair allocation" 
and the adm inistration of equity norms within 
bureaucratic procedures.
The political ambiguities of the book become dearer if we 
note how comforting it is both for the broad Left and for 
the Right. For the Right, it confirms the allegation that Left 
political analysis remains both romantically oppositional 
and too dumsy to handle the machinery of government. 
For the Left, a return to the rhetoric of romantic op- 
positionalism is appealing, at a time when it appears that 
both Labor Party politics and Left academic analysis have 
sold out
On the face of it, Australian political culture has changed 
substantially since the 70s. Theoretical shifts have meant 
that it is no longer so dear that 'Australian 80061/  is either 
progressing towards a historical goal (whether cultural 
identity and emandpation or thdr opposites). Nor can we 
speak so confidently of 'Australian culture', 'national char- 
acter' or 'sodety as a whole'. Other changes have made it 
difficult to treat social democratic politics as 'oppositional', 
or to assume that there is a clear separation between the 
prindpled positions of the Left and the calculations of 
government. For instance, the last 15 years have seen the 
governmental adoption and translation of a number of 
oppositional Left and feminist reform campaigns. Many of 
those who partidpated in these campaigns have become 
part of 'management'. At the same time a number of 
'progressive prindples' have become incorporated within 
areas of social policy. In equal opportunity programs, for 
instance, equity, partidpation and representation have be­
come routine standards and targets administered and 
monitored by complex bureaucratic procedures.
For some, these changes are symptoms of a creeping politi­
cal compromise caused by a generational shift towards 
co-option and cynidsm. For Pusey and others, what has 
been lost is the broad and global vision, the commitment 
to absolute prindples rather than to targets and quotas. In 
response, readers are invited to identify with a tradition of 
sodal reformist struggle and radical nationalism, strongly 
assodated with the campaigns of the 70s—a time which 
now seems untroubled by present confusions about the 
goals of the broad Left or by the painstaking disassembly 
of the more global elements of Left political analysis.
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It may be reassuring to have suspidons of collaboration 
confirmed and to be told that there is a clear and principled 
opposition between a tradition of social democratic prin­
ciple and the interests of the state. But there is much for the 
broad Left to be wary of here. Such forms of critique contain 
some comfortingly familiar elements of a romantic op- 
positionalism still strong within the Left. But for all their 
familiarity and appeal, they provide little connection to the 
work of those actually engaged in social policy. Conse-
Juently, they cannot hope to provide much access to policy ebates—and perhaps this is the point.
One of the striking features of Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra is its relentless insistence on global oppositions: 
between bureaucracy and culture, between the technical 
and the human, the economic and the social and so on. The 
use of this rhetoric is a clue that this is a particular type of 
cultural criticism, one conducted within highly formulaic 
terms, usually concentrating on dialectical oppositions and 
the possibility of transcending those oppositions in a new 
synthesis.
As Ian Hunter has pointed out recently (ALR 136, 
February), the rhetoric of cultural critique is deeply im­
bued with romanticism. In the case of Pusey, this is true in 
a loose sense, in that his forms of social criticism are 
explicitly utopian and dismissive of pragmatism and the 
'instrumentalist' focus on the practical utility of ideas 
rather than ideas themselves. But the comment also applies 
in a more strictly historical sense, identifying the influence 
of romanticism in the ethos and vocation of 'critique'. This 
perspective on 'critique' as an exercise allows us to see the 
'universal intellectual' and cultural critic as quite curious 
figures, attributed with surprising claims to possess special 
and transcendent vision. And despite the usual contradic­
tion between the human and the technical, these are in fact 
quite technical and highly specialised exercises.
Reflecting on the 'social whole', the cultural critic finds it 
centrally lacking, riven by splits between culture and 
utility, the economic and the social, the human and the 
technical, the feminine and the masculine. The expectation 
is that the dialectic between these opposed elements will 
be resolved in a moment of historical and political 
transcendence. Usually this takes the form of a lost histori­
cal moment—in this case, the 1970s. However, the pos­
sibility of achieving reconciliation in the future constitutes 
the kind of 'political vision' to which we are urged to be 
true (the vision of complete equality, human emancipation 
and social self-realisation). And until this moment comes, 
social and political existence will be found fundamentally 
Wanting, split into contradictions between culture and 
utility, the economic and the social, the organic and the 
technical, calculation and 'principle'—and, in this case, the 
bureaucratic and the democratic.
Such a moment, it is clear, becomes possible only when 
government is in the hands of a certain type of person. This 
special kind of person is, of course, the 'social democratic 
lntellectual' or cultural critic. Possessed of humanistic (in 
this case, sociological) forms of analysis, they are capable 
°f performing a certain kind of social critique, balancing 
Within themselves the instrumental and the principled, the
human and the technical and transcending them within 
special moments of social insight. The reader is offered 
identification with this attractive figure through the 
narrator's exemplification of the role. Pusey's adoption of 
the persona of the cultural critic allows him to claim a 
transcendent social and historical vision—even while 
criticising public servants for their "lack of 'connectedness' 
to a population with boring jobs".
Put in these terms, these claims seem more them a little 
immodest. The assumption is that the effect of social policy 
and public administration can be measured against 'social 
principle'—a set of absolute political values faithfully 
maintained within the ethos of cultural critique. In this 
scale, social administration will always be found wanting, 
being unable to exhibit a conscience as sensitive as that of 
the cultural critic.
‘For Pusey what has been 
lost is the broad and global 
vision. ’
There is a dual and reciprocal problem here. On the one 
hand, the scope and effect of academic liberal humanism 
is dramatically overestimated. On the other, the account is 
guilty of significantly underestimating the complexity of 
the bureaucratic ethos. And in the rest of this article, I want 
to argue that some indications of this complexity can be 
found within Pusey's research—but only if we are 
prepared to read against the grain of his argument.
As John Wanna recently pointed out (AIR 136, February), 
Pusey's account of the characteristics of Australian public 
administration is limited by a very narrow scope. There is, 
for instance, a concentration on the attitudes and back­
ground of individuals, at the expense of a more systematic 
treatment of the effects of induction and retraining within 
the workplace. A surprising amount of attention is paid to 
the effect of university education, whether economic or 
humanistic: as Wanna points out, the assumption is that 
officers' opinions come directly from their academic train­
ing. Part of the problem here is the humanist preoccupation 
with individuals and their attitudes and personal styles, 
rather than with the more formal aspects of the 
bureaucratic department of existence.
The problem is that the emphasis upon 'personality' ex­
cludes attention to the routines and norms which make up 
the ethos of bureaucratic work—an ethos which is in fact 
designed to reshape conduct, to regulate the expression of 
personal opinion and to require officers to distinguish 
between the 'values' appropriate to the political sphere and 
the analytical decisions involved in the implementation of 
particular policies. Surprisingly little attention is given to 
the process by which bureaucratic work translates and 
reshapes the capacities of the persons who work within it. 
Nor is there any sense that the bureaucratic ethos requires
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individuals to conduct themselves according to the duties- 
and responsibilities attached to a particular status.
Pusey does mention that many of the interviewees had 
sophisticated rationales for their responses, and he notes 
that a number of them claimed in fact to be social reformers, 
with a sophisticated grasp of the intellectual technical tech­
nology of the state. Nevertheless, responses which are not 
couched in the terms of humanist sociology are charac­
terised as assenting to a 'classically technocratic and 
positivistic view7. Senior public servants are described and 
treated as specialised intellectuals—and taken to task for 
not using a particular intellectual vocabulary. But at the 
same time, Pusey is quite unwilling to treat bureaucratic 
work as either intellectual or principled, since the opera­
tional standards and technical calculations of government 
are not completely consonant with 'value' and 'principle' 
as they are understood by cultural critique.
What's remarkable is how little concession is made to the 
argument that modem government (social democratic or 
not) requires particular instruments in order to function. 
Pusey does acknowledge that government programs 
depend upon a process of translating social or political 
goals into standards and targets, but his assumption is that 
such processes of translation are necessarily sinister. But is 
it really possible to imagine programs of social reform 
which do not rely on setting goals and targets and making 
them the objects of decisions? While these standards and 
targets used by social administration might be more or less 
sensitive to particular classes and contexts, they are neces­
sarily formal and abstract. In what way, then, is it useful to 
criticise social administration for using abstract, formal and 
systematic procedures or for conducting itself within the 
ethos of disinterest? To put the question another way, is it 
realistic to suggest the possibility that the criteria used in 
social administration could be grounded in what Pusey 
calls 'real tasks and situations'? This is equivalent to im­
agining modem government without statistics, censuses 
and demographic information, or any other of the instru­
ments and techniques on which the organisation of modem 
life has relied since at least the late 18th century.
These are complex issues, recently recast within new his­
torical investigations of citizenship, democracy, social 
rights and the building of states and societies. Addressing 
them fully would require a much more elaborate account 
of t theoretical and historical work on various intellectual 
and political technologies of the modern state. For now, it 
is perhaps enough to outline some arguments to the effect 
that we cannot expect social administration to dispense 
with the various instruments of government, including 
particular forms of bureaucratic accounting, conduct and 
rationality.
society which Pusey holds up as the alternative to 
bureaucratic rationality. The vision is one in which govern­
ment could be conducted entirely within the language of 
'the people', organic with the community and free of formal 
and abstract concerns. But despite the reference to the lost
indigenous tradition of the social democratic state, the 
vision bears little relation to the forms and procedures in 
which sociological terms such as '500361/, 'community' 
become thinkable. Following the work of the French 
thinkers Michel Foucault and Jacques Donzelot, it is pos­
sible to say that the domain which we call 'the social'—and 
the divisions which we discover within it—are in fact the 
product of particular instruments and strategies of govern­
ment, produced with definite and limited historical cir­
cumstances. Rather than being the result of an organic 
evolution towards social self-realisation, they are the tech­
nical effect of particular forms of governmental investiga­
tion and co-ordination.
Since Weber, it has been clear that the modem state is 
constituted by a definite range of instruments and techni­
ques, including rational economic planning and systems of 
accountability. These instruments are a central component 
of many schemes of social reform and social accounting— 
whether now, in the 1970s, or in the 1790s. These measures 
also include the elements which form an ethos of disinterest 
within bureaucracy, incorporating protocols and proce­
dures designed to make decisions independent of the at­
titudes of personnel and which require the subordination 
of 'the personal'.
To anticipate objections, let me insist that these instruments 
of government are far from 'natural' or 'neutral'. But nor, 
in themselves, are they the tools of political 'interests'. To 
draw on Foucault's terms, they form parts of particular 
apparatuses of government which now, as it happens, 
operate almost independently, and which cannot be 
described as either 'progressive' or 'regressive' in themsel­
ves. Neither the broad Left nor the broad Right would be 
able to operate without recourse to abstract and formalis­
ing instruments of government, whether statistical, 
demographic, economic or sociological. It is hard, for in­
stance, to imagine any program of equity-related social 
reform which could dispense with means to identify goals 
and objects of decisions.
Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that government invol­
ves processes which are both intellectual and technical, 
both ethical and goal-oriented—and that social administra­
tion involves kinds of training and conduct which are in 
many ways quite distinct from both democratic discourse 
and the ethos of cultural criticism. We need to recognise 
that the notion of trying to make governmental procedures 
'fit' with the principles espoused by cultural critics is quite 
utopian and politically unhelpful. Agreeing to these 
propositions might entail renouncing some of the appeal 
of oppositionalism. But it might also stimulate forms of 
political evaluation which avoid political romanticism and 
•vhich bear more relation to the work of those actually 
involved in social administration.
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